Date: 6 January 2026

The criminal law landscape in Queensland during 2025 was shaped by continued appellate attention to sentencing discretion, moral culpability, mental impairment, youth justice, and the proper recording of convictions. A consistent theme emerging from the Court of Appeal was the need for sentencing courts to undertake careful, offence-specific analysis, supported by adequate reasons, while balancing denunciation, rehabilitation, and community protection.

R v Johnston [2025] QCA 112

Manslaughter by dangerous driving and moral culpability

The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed an application for leave to appeal against sentence, providing important guidance on the seriousness of manslaughter offences committed by deliberate dangerous driving and the assessment of moral culpability.

The applicant pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter and one count of attempting to pervert justice. The manslaughter arose from the applicant deliberately driving his vehicle across the centre line and into the path of an oncoming vehicle, striking the driver’s side door of the deceased’s car at speed. The deceased was an entirely innocent road user and died as a result of the collision.

The applicant, who was 21 years old at the time of the offending and had no prior criminal or traffic history, submitted that his moral culpability should be regarded as reduced. He argued that his intention had been to take his own life rather than cause harm to others.

The Court rejected that submission. It held that offending which results in the death of an innocent member of the public, caused by a deliberate course of driving where serious harm or death was inevitable, falls at the more serious end of manslaughter by driving. The deliberate nature of the driving and the devastating consequences warranted a sentence reflecting strong denunciation.

The Court further confirmed that a reduction in moral culpability requires evidence of a mental condition or impairment affecting the offender’s mental capacity at the time of the offending. In the absence of such evidence, the Court found there was no proper basis to reduce culpability, notwithstanding the offender’s subjective intention to self-harm.

The application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed.

R v BZZ & AZY [2025] QCA 89

Mental health and criminal responsibility

The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown appeal against sentence, reaffirming key principles governing youth sentencing for serious violent offending under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld).

The respondents, who were juveniles at the time, pleaded guilty to multiple offences including four counts of malicious act with intent. The offending involved breaking into the victims’ home and inflicting serious injuries on several family members using weapons. Both respondents were under the influence of illicit substances at the time of the offending.

The Crown argued that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate and that the sentencing judge erred in exercising discretion under s 176(3)(b) of the Youth Justice Act, particularly by treating the offences as not “particularly heinous” and by declining to record convictions.

The Court rejected those submissions. It held that s 176(3)(b) requires assessment of whether an offence is “particularly heinous” by reference to the circumstances of the particular offence, not by comparison with other offending. The Court found no error in the sentencing judge’s approach of imposing global head sentences with concurrent terms, nor in the exercise of discretion to order release after service of 50 per cent of the detention period.

Importantly, the Court reaffirmed that under the Youth Justice Act the prima facie position is that a conviction should not be recorded against a child, unless the sentencing judge is positively satisfied that it should be. In this case, the sentencing judge had properly considered the respondents’ youth, personal histories, mental health vulnerabilities, traumatic backgrounds, demonstrated remorse, and genuine rehabilitation efforts, including participation in restorative justice processes.

The Crown failed to identify any legal error or unreasonableness warranting appellate intervention. The appeal was dismissed.

Even for serious violent offending, youth sentencing remains guided by rehabilitation, and convictions should not be recorded against children unless positively justified.

R v Henshall [2025] QCA 20

Recording of convictions and adequacy of sentencing reasons

The Queensland Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal against sentence and varied an order recording a conviction for sexual assault, substituting a sentence of 18 months’ probation with no conviction recorded.

The applicant was 35 years old and had been wheelchair-bound since the age of two. He was a university student at the time of the offending, which occurred on a university campus. The applicant approached the complainant, who was alone in a cafeteria area, touched her leg and thigh, and touched his own groin area. The complainant felt uncomfortable and did not believe she could move away due to the position of the applicant’s wheelchair.

Although the complainant was 14 years old, it was accepted that the applicant held an honest and reasonable belief that she was not under 16, based on her having told him she was 16 years old. This supported a finding of exceptional circumstances such that actual imprisonment was not required under Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(4)(c).

The issue on appeal was whether the sentencing judge failed to give adequate reasons for recording a conviction. The Court of Appeal concluded that the sentencing remarks did not explain why a conviction was recorded, observing that “the reader is totally left in the dark” as to the basis for that decision.

When re-exercising the sentencing discretion, the Court emphasised that the decision to record a conviction requires active consideration of whether recording a conviction is necessary in the circumstances, including whether the community would be better served by recording or not recording a conviction. The Court also noted that both the prosecution and the defence at the original sentence hearing proceeded on the basis that if a probation order were imposed, no conviction should be recorded.

The sentence was varied to remove the recorded conviction.

R v Rodriguez [2025] QCA 34

Undiagnosed mental impairment, moral culpability, and credit for guilty plea

The Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against sentence arising from a conviction for rape, varying the custodial component of the sentence while maintaining the original head sentence.

The applicant was 18 years old at the time of the offending and had no prior criminal history. The complainant was 19 years old. After engaging in consensual sexual intercourse, the applicant attempted further sexual contact, which the complainant clearly refused. The complainant later fell asleep and awoke to the applicant penetrating her vagina without consent until ejaculation, without a condom.

Following the offence, during a recorded telephone call with the complainant, the applicant admitted the non-consensual nature of the intercourse and stated that he would harm himself if the matter were reported to police. The sentencing judge regarded this conduct as emotionally manipulative.

The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended after 20 months for an operational period of five years. On appeal, the Court held that while the five-year head sentence was appropriate, the requirement that the applicant serve one-third of the sentence in custody before suspension was manifestly excessive.

The Court emphasised several powerful mitigating factors: the applicant’s extreme youth, absence of relevant criminal history, early guilty plea, substantial evidence of rehabilitation, and a low assessed risk of sexual reoffending. Of particular significance was evidence of an undiagnosed mental health condition at the time of the offending, which had since stabilised. While that condition did not excuse the conduct, it bore upon the applicant’s moral culpability and meant that a period of actual imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him than on an offender without such vulnerabilities.

The sentence was varied so that the five-year term of imprisonment was suspended after 12 months served, rather than 20 months.

Conclusion

The 2025 appellate decisions reflect a careful and nuanced approach to sentencing across a spectrum of serious criminal offending. Several themes emerge:

• Denunciation remains paramount where deliberate conduct causes catastrophic harm to innocent members of the public.

• Moral culpability cannot be reduced without evidentiary foundation, particularly where mental impairment is relied upon.

• Youth justice continues to prioritise rehabilitation, with strong restraint in recording convictions against children.

• Recording a conviction is never automatic and requires clear, articulated reasons, even in sexual offence cases.

• Mental health vulnerabilities, particularly where identified and stabilised, continue to play an important moderating role in sentencing outcomes.

Practitioners entering 2026 should expect continued appellate scrutiny of sentencing reasoning, especially in relation to culpability assessments, custodial thresholds, and the statutory framework governing youth offenders and convictions.